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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Real Property Depreciation Recapture: An
Ineffectual Reform of the Tax Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
This note stems from a belief that an asymmetrical body of tax
laws is a challenge to the legal profession which, by training, experience
and tradition, is well situated to spur and guide reform. It is my
intention to outline the story of but one section of the Internal
Revenue Code: why it was proposed, what it sought to do, how it
underwent modification by an unsympathetic congressional commit-
tee, and how it was finally enacted as a superficial compromise with
the underlying asymmetry of our tax laws. In short, what follows is
an appended bar in the organ theme entitled "A Requiem in Honor
of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws."'
The plan is not to describe in depth the technical operation of an
Internal Revenue Code section;2 but rather, to describe and illustrate
in some measure how the tax laws bestow certain special benefits upon
a particular economic group-i.e., real estate investors. The plan
further is to explore the efforts of the United States Treasury toward
reform of the law and to criticize and evaluate Congress' response:
section 1250 which was enacted in 1964. Finally, relevant economic
principles will be surveyed in the hope that a few helpful guidelines
can be suggested for future efforts at reform.
II. BUILDING A FORTUNE ON TAX SHELTERED REAL ESTATE
Mr. Paul Anderson, tax attorney and member of the San Francisco
Bar has written:
Real estate presents a number of important tax advantages that make it an
extremely desirable investment for the purposes of capital growth. The
most important of these advantages are in the areas of depreciation,
equity financing, and tax-free exchanges. By a shrewd combining of
these advantages, a personal estate may be built up more rapidly in real
estate than in any other type of investment property (save perhaps in more
risky oil investments).
3
1. From the title of Professor William Cary's concerned and thoughtful article, Pressure
Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity
of the Tax Laws, 68 HAnv. L. REv. 745 (1955). For an historical discussion of the
American tax system's evolution and a persuasive appeal to the legal profession for its
future guidance, see PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1954). See also STERN,
THE GREAT TREAsURY RAmn (1965), for another view of the tax law asymmetry.
2. There is an overabundance of literature now existent on the technical operation
of the depreciation recapture sections. See note 40 infra, and the appended bibliography.
3. ANDmaSON, TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE OPERATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1965).
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In the hearings on the Revenue Act of 1962 before the Senate
Committee on Finance, Treasury Secretary Dillon outlined how
these tax advantages are used:
Under present rules depreciation at accelerated rates applies not only to
the taxpayer's investment, but also to the amount of mortgage indebtedness
to which the property is subject. Since the acquisition of real estate is
usually heavily financed by mortgage indebtedness, accelerated depreciation
often provides deductions far in excess of the income from the property. In
such cases the investor is able, because of the depreciation deduction, to
amortize the principal of the mortgage, to obtain a nontaxable cash return
of 10 to 12 percent or more on his equity investment, and even to wipe
out tax on other income at top bracket rates. When the depreciation deduc-
tions cease to produce such spectacular results, the property is frequently
sold. Thus the excess depreciation, having been charged against income
taxable at ordinary rates, is recouped and taxed only as capital gains.
4
Much has been written on the foregoing possibilities as well as on
others more subtle though perhaps less dramatic.5 The sophisticated
small real estate investor 6 should, by now, be well aware of the
principles used, while the large investor has probably been using
them for years.
The more significant economic features of investment in real estate
and the related tax shelter advantages can be grouped under the
four following headings: leverage, depreciation, maintenance and
disposition. To illustrate the financial principles involved and the tax
favoritism granted by present law, a hypothetical real estate invest-
ment project will be described and analyzed. Although it is assumed
that the hypothetical project is owned by an individual, the principles
demonstrated extend to most other forms of ownership. Consequently,
under a fifth heading some of the problems and advantages of the
alternative ownership forms for a real estate investment will be
discussed briefly.
A. Leverage
The term "leverage" in real estate financing refers to the ratio of
4. Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 88 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearings].
5. The more detailed recent treatments are ANnFaso,T supra note 3; C=u, REAL
ESTATE AND THE FEDERAL INcomE TAx (1965); PRENTICE HALL, EDITORAL STAFF,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAx SHELTER PR~cncEs 710-82 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
ENCYCLOPEDA OF TAX SHELTER PRAcnCEs]. A helpful manual on both and financial
planning of real estate transactions is CASEY, REAL ESTATE DESK BOOK (1964). The
appendix of tables in the manual is useful for analytical computations similar to the
ones that will be set out here.
6. His sophistication may be the product of his own efforts or simply the result of his
wisdom in heeding his tax advisors, who are barraged with literature on tax shelter
practices. That literature has a very special place for real estate tax rules.
7. See the examples cited in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAX SHELTERa PnAcTicEs at 715-17.
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creditor's equity to owner's equity. Though not often attainable,
an ideal ratio would be 1 to 0, and would depend for its existence
upon an investor having a prime personal credit rating. More
prevalent, however, is the highly favorable ratio of building and
improvement cost to land cost. That is, the investor owning the
land outright mortgages the whole property for an amount equal to
the cost of buildings and improvements. Experienced real estate
investors, who know how to design a physical structure and its re-
sultant economics of operation to an institutional lender's satisfaction,
will frequently obtain creditor financing for all costs of improvements.
Such an investor would expect the annual net cash flow from his
project to be from ten to thirty-five per cent of his own cash invest-
ment, even after amortization of the mortgage principal.8
The hypothetical investment project illustrates this kind of leverage.
Its owner has bought unimproved land for 200,000 dollars and has
borrowed 1,000,000 dollars with which to erect an apartment house.
Table 1 shows his amortization schedule for a six per cent interest-
bearing mortgage note which is payable in twenty equal annual
installments of 87,190 dollars.
TABLE 1
MORTGAGE AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE
End of Interest Principal Balance
Year Paid Paid Unpaid
1 60,000 27,190 972,810
2 58,370 28,820 943,990
3 56,640 30,550 913,440
4 54,810 32,380 881,060
5 52,860 34,330 846,730
6 50,800 36,390 810,340
7 48,620 38,570 771,770
8 46,310 40,880 730,890
9 43,850 43,340 687,550
10 41,250 45,940 641,610
11 38,500 48,690 592,920
12 35,580 51,610 541,310
13 32,480 54,710 486,600
14 29,200 57,990 428,610
15 25,720 61,470 367,140
16 22,030 65,160 301,980
17 18,120 69,070 232,910
18 13,970 73,220 159,690
8. Id. at 713.
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19 9,580 77,610 82,080
20 4,920 82,080 -0-
743,610 1,000,000
While this investor owns and operates the project, its gross receipts
stream will be reduced by annual mortgage payment commitments of
87,190 dollars, of which the interest portion is tax deductible. Essen-
tially, then, for a cash outlay of only 200,000 dollars, through leverag-
ing the investor has become entitled to the gross receipts stream from
an asset costing 1,200,000 dollars. This cash stream is reduced, of
course, by partially tax deductible mortgage note payments.
A second important feature of real estate leverage is pyramiding,
the key to which is the investor's rising ownership interest. As the
years pass, the owner makes his annual mortgage principal payments,
thereby increasing his equity in the project. For example, at the
end of the fifth year, owner's equity has increased from 200,000
dollars (initial cash investment) to 353,270 dollars (200,000 dollars
plus 153,270 dollars, the sum of the first five principal payments). If
market value of the apartment house should increase along with the
equity, the investor can put his dualistically increased ownership
interest to work by refinancing the mortgage to, or beyond, its original
amount. This step need not increase annual debt-service cash re-
quirements, though it will increase the total number of remaining
periods subject to a debt burden. If market value has neither risen
during a five year period nor significantly declined, the investor might
refinance his mortgage to its original amount of 1,000,000 dollars,
thereby obtaining cash proceeds of 153,270 dollars. Because this new
mortgage principal would probably have to be repaid in the remaining
fifteen years of the original mortgage term, he would have to show the
mortgagee that the project's gross receipts stream could sustain the
burden of increased annual mortgage payments (the annual payment
required to amortize a six per cent, fifteen year, 1,000,000 dollar
mortgage loan would be 102,970 dollars). Under whatever conditions
he obtains refinancing, the investor can use the proceeds to buy more
land upon which another willing creditor will erect a new building.
Pyramiding of real estate holdings thereby results.
Lender attitudes make these leveraging techniques particularly well
suited to investments in new store and office buildings, shopping
centers, apartment houses, motels, and any commercial or industrial
real estate development to be tenanted under a long-term lease by a
financially responsible enterprise.
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B. Depreciation
As indicated by Secretary Dillon's comments, accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances tend to protect a part or all of a real estate investment
project's cash flow from taxation. The property's total basis, that is,
the sum of the creditor's equity and the owner's equity, less the
portion thereof attributable to land, is subject to tax deductible
depreciation. Accelerated depreciation on new real property may
be computed by the double declining balance method, or by any
other reasonable method not producing in the first two-thirds of the
asset's life deduction in excess of those permitted under the double
declining balance method.9 Depreciation of used real property may
not be accelerated beyond the limits of the one hundred fifty per cent
declining balance method.10 The most commonly used methods of
depreciating real estate are probably sum of the years' digits, double
declining balance, one hundred fifty per cent declining balance, and
straight line." A less commonly used method but one having some
unusual implications is the sinking fund method.12 Figure 1 compares
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(a)-(b).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(c), and Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-O(b), delimiting
reasonableness of methods applied to any property subject to depreciation under §
167(a).
11. Straight line depreciation is computed by dividing asset life into depreciable basis;
the quotient is the recurring annual depreciation charge. For example, annual straight
line depreciation for a depreciable basis of $100 and a five-year asset life is $20 ($100
divided by 5). Declining balance depreciation results from a constant rate applied to
the undepreciated remainder of the asset's basis and the constant rate used is some
multiple of the straight line rate. The method called double declining balance, or 200%
declining balance, uses a constant rate which is double the straight line rate. In the
foregoing example the straight line rate is 20%. Thus the double declining balance rate
is 40%. The first year's depreciation would be $40 (40% of $100); the next year's
would be $24 (40% of $60, the $60 being the undepreciated remainder, $100 minus
accumulated depreciation of earlier periods amounting to $40). The 150% declining
balance method applies a rate one and one-half times the straight line rate. In the
example it would be 30%. The sum of the years digits method applies a sliding rate
to the asset's original depreciable basis. The sliding rate is a fraction, the denominator
of which is the sum of the digits of the years of asset life, and the numerator of which
is the number of years of remaining life at the beginning of the year for which de-
preciation is being computed. The denominator does not change but the numerator is
smaller each successive year. In the example, the denominator is 15 (1+2+3±4+5)
and the numerator for year one is five, for year two it is four, and so on. Depreciation
in year one would be $33 (5/15 times $100), in year two, $27 (4/15 times $100), and
so on.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-4(a) specifically mentions use of the sinking fund method
as being permissible whenever use of the double declining balance method would be.
Lest the name be misleading, it should be emphasized that no cash fund is set aside
when this method is used. It is merely another way of calculating annual depreciation
charges. To compute sinking fund depreciation for the first year, refer to a table of the
compound amount of 1 per period (or as it is sometimes called, amount of annuity of
1 per period), choose a rate of interest, and find a factor in the table opposite the
number of years of the depreciable asset's life. Dividing this factor into the depreciable
basis produces a dollar amount which becomes the first year's depreciation charge. For
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these methods graphically. For each method of depreciation, a con-
tinuous curve is plotted through points representing annual deprecia-
tion of an asset costing 1,000 dollars and having a twenty-year life. 13






0 5 10 15 20
YEARS
example, if the asset life is 15 years and the rate of interest is 6%, the factor from the
table is 23.2759699. Dividing this into a depreciable basis of $1000 gives a first year
depreciation charge of $42.97. Depreciation for any subsequent year is this $42.97
plus an amount equal to 6% of total depreciation accumulated at the beginning of the
year. In the second year of the example, depreciation would be $45.55 ($42.97 plus
6% of $42.97), while in the third year it would be $48.28 ($42.97 plus 6% of $88.52,
the sum of the prior depreciation taken which was $42.97 and $45.55). The annual
principal payments column of a mortgage amortization schedule for $1000 at 6% interest
would reflect the same numerical information since its computation is identical to
computation of sinking fund depreciation charges. An informative article on the use-
fulness of the sinking fund method is Parish, A New Concept of Real Estate Deprecia-
tion, 41 TAXES 598 (1963).
13. For straight line and sum of the years digits, zero salvage value is assumed. How-
ever, taking salvage value into account merely drops these two curves vertically without
affecting their shapes. Sinking fund depreciation is computed under 6% rate of interest.
A lower rate of interest would cause the curve to begin at a higher level but rise
rapidly without reaching as high a final peak.
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To increase depreciation early in the property's life, the investor
may segregate the cost of such non-structural components as heating
and air conditioning apparatus, plumbing, electrical wiring, elevators
and paving. These components may be depreciated over a much
shorter life span than may the structural frame of the building. The
larger the proportion of the property's cost arising from non-structural
components, the greater is the accumulation of permissible deprecia-
tion deductions early in the asset's life.
Table 2 shows double declining balance depreciation over the first
ten years of the hypothetical investment project's operation. The
1,000,000 dollar cost of the apartment house was expended ninety
per cent for the building and ten per cent for the various non-struc-
tural components. The former has an estimated useful life of forty
years while the latter has a life of only fifteen years.
TABLE 2





































The table shows that under these rapid depreciation methods this
project is 43.7 per cent depreciated in the first one-fourth of its life.
The next two tables demonstrate why accelerated depreciation
methods are preferred by real estate investors. Briefly stated, the
reason is maximization of cash throwoff, a term meaning the net
spendable cash produced by operations. Table 3 shows cash throwoff
for each of the first ten years of the hypothetical project's operation.
It was computed as follows: assuming annual gross rentals of 150,000
dollars and annual operating expenses of 45,000 dollars, the project's
annual operating income would be 105,000 dollars. The annual
depreciation charge and the interest portion of the annual mortgage
payment was deducted from this operating income to arrive at net
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taxable income, or loss. Tax was computed thereon at 1965 rates
under the assumption that this investor has an annual taxable income
from other sources of 40,000 dollars.
To reflect more accurately the total economic advantage of the
depreciation tax shelter, the net taxable loss was subtracted from this
other taxable income of 40,000 dollars. The resultant tax saving is
included as part of the cash throwoff of this project to this taxpayer.
Both tax savings and losses are incremental amounts. That is, tax on
40,000 dollars was computed, tax on income after including income
or loss from this project was computed, and then the difference in
the total tax bill was shown as tax incurred or saved by this project.
For computational simplicity income averaging was ignored. Then
to arrive at net spendable cash from operations, the non-cash provision
for depreciation was added back to taxable income, and the cash out-
lays for taxes and non-deductible mortgage principal payments were
subtracted.
TABLE 3
ANALYsis oF CASH TimowoFF
UNDER DouBLE Dx crNG BALANcE DEPRECTATION
Taxable Tax Net
Operating Interest DDB Income Incurred Principal Spendable
Year Income Paid Depreciation or (Loss) or (Saved) Paid Cash
1 105,000 60,000 58,330 (13,330) ( 5,519) 27,190 23,329
2 105,000 58,370 54,310 (7,680) ( 3,346) 28,820 21,156
3 105,000 56,640 50,600 (2,240) ( 1,008) 30,550 18,818
4 105,000 54,810 47,290 2,900 1,392 32,380 16,418
5 105,000 52,860 44,160 7,980 3,910 34,330 13,900
6 105,000 50,800 41,340 12,860 6,376 36,390 11,434
7 105,000 48,620 38,770 17,610 8,893 38,570 8,917
8 105,000 46,310 36,310 22,380 11,421 40,880 6,389
9 105,000 43,850 34,130 27,020 13,941 43,340 3,869
10 105,000 41,250 32,020 31,730 16,532 45,940 1,278
1,050,000 513,510 437,260 99,230 52,592 358,390 125,508
If this investor feels that the market value of his apartment house
will not decline below his original cost (and probably in today's
market many investors so assume, at least for the first ten-year period)
then the true index of this project's profitability is the sum of the
last two columns of Table 3, mortgage principal paid (an amount
redeemable if the project can be sold at a price equal to or exceeding
cost) plus cash throwoff. Thus profitability is not measured by taxable
income, the annual increase of which tends to bear an inverse
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relation to the annual decrease in the sum of principal paid and cash
throwoff. Parenthetically, one might remark upon the curious nature
of a law designed to tax income progressively where the measure of
the tax may be inversely related to profits.
Table 4 shows this project's cash throwoff under various methods of
depreciation. For the um of the years digits depreciation and for
straight line depreciation, the apartment house's salvage value is
assumed to be zero; the sinking fund annual depreciation charge
is computed under a six per cent rate of interest assumption.
TABLE 4
COMNAISON OF CASH TimowoFF
UmNDm VARmoUs METHODS OF DEPECIATION
Double Sum of 150
Declining the Years Declining Straight Sinking
Year Balance Digits Balance Line Fund
1 23,329 22,624 17,210 9,860 (458)
2 21,156 21,202 15,320 8,996 (1,021)
3 18,818 19,707 13,375 8,079 (1,649)
4 16,418 17,990 11,445 7,109 (2,315)
5 13,900 16,149 9,452 6,076 (3,027)
6 11,434 14,170 7,438 4,963 (3,778)
7 8,917 12,080 5,398 3,764 (4,571)
8 6,389 9,902 3,286 2,494 (5,411)
9 3,869 7,533 1,125 1,141 (6,309)
10 1,278 5,128 (1,032) (289) (7,256)
125,508 146,485 83,017 52,193 (35,795)
The difference in any year between the amounts of cash throwoff
resulting from the use of one depreciation method or another is
solely attributable to a difference in income taxes incurred. In year
one, for example, this project owner's tax bill when he uses the
straight line depreciation method is 13,469 dollars greater than it is
when he uses the double declining balance method. This amount is
the difference in cash throwoff for the year (23,329 dollars minus
9,860 dollars). The reason, of course, is that depreciation is a non-
cash item which is tax deductible.
Inspection of Table 4 reveals that cash throwoff over ten years is
greatest under sum of the years' digits depreciation, assuming no
salvage value. Of the four most commonly used depreciation methods
(the first four from left to right), cash throwoff is least under straight
line depreciation (146,485 dollars versus 52,193 dollars). Use only
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of the sinking fund method will create a necessity for the investor to
contribute more cash to his project each year for the first ten years.
In later years, however, under all the other methods, cash from outside
sources will eventually be required. This is due both to declining
annual depreciation charges and to declining annual interest deduc-
tions. Obviously, many investors who must nurture a project with
cash are much more likely to turn toward another project which will
for some years produce an annual cash throwoff. Such an investor
will probably sell this project or at least refinance its mortgage.
Nevertheless, the latter will not affect the decline in annual deprecia-
tion charges where sale and reinvestment of the proceeds would
produce new and higher depreciation allowances.
From Table 4 emerges a forceful conclusion, and one well recog-
nized by investors or their advisors. To maximize depreciation
deductions over the taxpayer's anticipated holding period (which is
not necessarily the project's life) is to maximize the sum of annual
cash throwoffs by minimizing taxes. Consequently, much literature
has evolved on the esoteric methodology of depreciation.' 4 Determi-
nations of estimated useful lives and of estimated salvage values
deserve special mention because of their pervasiveness. While the
selection of an estimated useful life is common to all methods of de-
preciation, no selection of an estimated salvage value is necessary if
the taxpayer uses a declining balance method of depreciation because
it already has an arithmetically built-in salvage factor. Since the lesser
the life and the salvage value, the greater the depreciation, taxpayer
estimates tend to be low while Treasury estimates tend to be high.
Therefore, much administrative and judicial effort inevitably is spent
on resolving these factual questions.1
5
14. An example is literature on the year to switch to straight line depreciation. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(e)(1) permits a taxpayer, whenever he so chooses, to
switch from one of the accelerated methods to the straight line method for depreciating
the undepreciated remainder of an asset basis. Figure 1 has illustrated that annual rapid
depreciation charges decline below annual straight line depreciation charges about mid-
way in the asset's life. A little later in the life, they tend to decline below what straight
line charges on the undepreciated balance would be. Thus to maximize depreciation,
the taxpayer should switch methods at that time. Tables showing the year to switch
methods according to length of asset life can be found in Richs, Year to Switch to
Straight Line Depreciation, 39 ACCOUNTING REV. 685 (1964). On switching with re-
spect to group properties, see Greene, Changing from Declining Balance to Straight-
Line Depreciation, 38 ACCOUNTING REv. 355 (1963).
15. Administrative effort is made at two levels, one being the audit and enforcement
level while the other is what might be called the rule promulgation level. Issuing from
the latter, Bulletin "F" and its successor, Depreciation Guidelines and Rules, Revenue
Procedure 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 418, are attempts to deal with the life determina-
tion problem. An article co-authored by Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue from 1961 to 1964, reviews some of the administrative difficulties arising in
this area. Caplin & Klayman, Depreciation-1965 Model, J. Accountancy, April 1965,




Constant maintenance and repair expenditures to preserve property
value and useful life can prevent the deterioration that depreciation
allowances theoretically represent. Such casual but regular expendi-
tures are also deductible from ordinary income. What is here referred
to is the value enhancement created by a process over time. Value is
a function of income expectations which such a policy can influence,
for example, by shaping tenant goodwill and its derivative, occupancy
rate. But any single expenditure significantly enhancing value or
arresting deterioration must be capitalized.", To the extent that a
systematic policy of maintenance increases the value of the building,
or prevents its deterioration, deductions from ordinary income are
converted into potential capital gains. 17
D. Disposition
As Secretary Dillon pointed out, once the spectacular depreciation-
sheltered portion of the cash flow begins to subside, the real estate
investor may dispose of his property. He will seek preferential taxa-
tion of his gain, or perhaps, he will be able to have his gain com-
pletely unrecognized. Gain on the sale of real estate held for over
six months is taxed at capital gains rates if the property is held for use
in a trade or business, for use as a personal residence, or for the pro-
duction of income or for investment. Only gain on real estate held by
a dealer for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business is taxed
as ordinary income. Capital gains are taxed at a maximum of twenty-
five per cent, while ordinary income might be taxed as high as seventy
per cent. Furthermore, gains on dispositions of real property may go
unrecognized in a number of situations. Generally, section 1034 grants
the seller of a personal residence a tax-free rollover if he buys a new
residence within a specified time at a cost equal to the selling price
of the old. Under the section 1031 like-kind exchange rules, an
exchange of one parcel of real property for another is tax free, no
matter how divergent their uses might be. Neither gain nor loss is
recognized, though basis carries over. Section 1031, however, is not
have been collected in a table showing type of building, useful life as chosen by a
court, and case citation. 4 P-H 1966 FED. TAx SERv. ff 14159D.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
17. An interesting illustration of tax alchemy is presented in ENCYCLOPEDIA Or TAX
SHELTER PRAcTICES at 773-74. Business realty which can be sold at a profit is in need
of repair. If the repair would increase the sale price by an amount equal to its cost, the
owner's tax bill for the year in which he repairs and sells would be reduced by his tax
bracket rate times 50% of the repair expenditure. Suppose the repair cost to be $5000,
the resultant sale price increase to be $5000, and the taxpayer's rate bracket to be 50%:
the year's tax bill is decreased by $1250.
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applicable to exchanges by dealers or residence owners. On the
other hand, losses on dispositions of real estate holdings do not
necessarily receive parallel treatment. A residence owner's loss is
a personal expense and non-deductible, whereas, a loss incurred on
property held for the production of income or for investment is treated
as a capital loss. 8 But a loss on property held for use in a trade or
business is an ordinary loss under section 1231 which may be deducted
from ordinary income. 19 If an investor sustains a loss upon selling
his realty, the crucial question of whether his operation of rental
property constituted a trade or business within the meaning of section
1231 will arise. Generally, the rule applies when the owner's activ-
ities are substantial and regular rather than incidental and sporadic."0
The installment sale provisions of section 453 provide another special
tax treatment accorded sales of realty. The gross profit portion of
installment payments on an obligation arising from the sale of
realty may be taxed in the year the payments are received, provided
that payments received in the year of sale do not exceed thirty per
cent of the selling price.
E. Forms of Ownership
In addition to the outright ownership by an individual assumed
in the foregoing discussion, two significant forns of ownership are
available to real estate investors: ownership by partnership or owner-
ship by corporation. The incorporated partnership, as a corporate
election under Subchapter S is sometimes called, is unavailable for
real estate investments where the corporation's income from rents
exceeds twenty per cent of gross receipts, a limitation imposed by
section 1372(e) (5).
18. In general, an individual's long-term capital losses are netted against long-term
capital gains. An excess of losses is first used to offset short-term capital gains. There-
after, the deduction for the year of any remaining capital loss is limited to $1000. For
years beginning after 1963, individuals may carry forward unused capital losses indef-
initely. Generally, corporations may use capital losses only to offset capital gains and
may carry forward such losses only for five years. See IT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§
1201, 1202, 1211, 1212.
19. Section 1231 gains are netted against § 1231 losses for the year. A net gain
is capital gain; a net loss is ordinary loss. The rule is the same whether the tax-
payer is a corporation or an individual.
20. The question is one of fact. If the owner devotes a substantial amount of time
to managing a number of rental units, he is engaged in a trade or business. Gilford v.
Commissioner, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953); I.T. 3711, 1945 Cum. BULL. 162,
164. The courts have split on whether operation of one rental unit is sufficient. See,
e.g., Cole v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 558 (D. Wyo. 1956)(held insufficient);
Anders I. Lagreide, 23 T.C. 508 (1954)(held sufficient). If the property rented is
unimproved, and therefore investment property, the owner is not engaged in a trade or
business. Susan P. Emery, 17 T.C. 308, 311 (1951). On balance, it seems that courts
generally resolve this factual question in favor of the taxpayer.
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Although the partnership requires profit sharing, it offers an oppor-
tunity for risk sharing which may be attractive to the investor. Since
a partnership is not a taxable entity, that is, its income or loss retains
its character as it passes directly to each partner, the interacting
principles of leverage, depreciation and capital gains are, in general,
equally applicable to the partnership form or to the individual
ownership form. But a partnership is an entity for many purposes,
some of which may affect real estate investors.21
On the other hand, a corporation is a separate, taxable entity, which
may have one or more owners. Leverage, depreciation and capital
gains are generally also available to a corporation but are subject
to the intricacies of corporate tax law.22 First of all, tax rates on
individuals and on corporations differ, the former presently ranging
from fourteen to seventy per cent, the latter from twenty-two to
forty-eight per cent. A corporate capital gain is taxed at no more than
twenty-five per cent while an individual's capital gain is taxed either
one-half at ordinary income rates, or, at most, the whole at twenty-five
per cent. If the owner wants to extract his profits and capital apprecia-
tion from the corporation, he will probably incur a tax, either at ordi-
nary income rates if the distribution is a dividend or at capital gains
rates if the corporation is liquidated in a taxable transaction, though
corporate liquidations are sometimes tax-free. 23 To encourage corpora-
tions to distribute taxable dividends, the law imposes a tax on excessive
accumulation of corporate earnings.2 Finally, since the tax shelter
practices in real estate are associated with investment projects perhaps
slated for early liquidation, either of two Code provisions might trigger
unexpected taxes: the personal holding company sectionsz  or the
21. Other than the fact of passed-through income retaining its character, the most
significant implications of the partnership form are probably in the estate planning area.
For example, an individual's heir finds the depreciable asset's basis stepped up because
of the original owner's death. However, the partner's heir has the undepreciable basis
of his new partnership interest stepped up rather than the depreciable basis of the asset
itself. See generally the partnership chapter in ANDmERSON, op. cit. supra note 3.
22. One intricacy of corporate tax law without parallel in the taxation of individuals
is found in INT. BEV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(j). If a corporation is able to obtain mort-
gage loan proceeds in excess of the property's basis because of liberal F.H.A. guarantees,
any distribution of such proceeds to the shareholders is taxed as a dividend. Therefore,
the pyramiding of investments mentioned earlier may be restricted to the corporation's
ownership if refinancing creates a new, federally guaranteed mortgage in excess of the
property's basis. To distribute the proceeds to the individual shareholder for his own
pyramiding would be to reduce substantially the monies produced by refinancing.
23. The general rule is that a corporate liquidation is like a sale of stock. INT. Rrv.
CODE OF 1954, § 331(a)(1). But under certain circumstances, § 333 permits non-
recognition of liquidation gains. See generally Brrrmm, FEDmkAL INcoM TAXAMON OF
COaxOR'onONS AN SHA=orDans, ch. 9 (1959).
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
25. INT. PRv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 541-47. A closely-held corporation with 50% stock
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collapsible corporation section.26
Since a corporation cannot pass losses directly to its owner, a
modification of the preceding cash throwoff analysis is necessary.
Operating losses early in the project's life confer no direct tax benefit
upon the corporation's owner. Neither do they confer immediate tax
benefit upon the corporation unless it has other income against which
the losses can be offset. Net operating losses may be carried forward
for only five years to offset whatever later profits arise. Thus, the
prudent investor will carefully estimate early-life operating income
before he chooses a depreciation method since too rapid depreciation
could generate unusable tax losses.
III. THE TREAsuRy AND =H CONGRESS
In his 1962 appearance before the Senate Committee on Finance,
Secretary Dillon proposed that depreciation on realty and personalty
be subjected to recapture. That is, to the extent that a sale of property
produced gain attributable to previously allowed depreciation deduc-
tions, the gain should be taxed as ordinary income. To show the
need for the proposal as it would affect real estate, Treasury exhibits2l
introduced before the Committee detailed various investor uses of the
principles mentioned in the first part of this note. However, Secretary
Dillon added, if Congress would first amend section 167 to disallow
accelerated depreciation of real property, and thus get at the essence
of the tax shelter, the Treasury deemed it appropriate to have a
sliding scale cut-off of recapture.2 He conditionally proposed that
real estate depreciation subject to recapture be reduced by one per-
centage point for each month over six years that the property had been
held by the taxpayer. At the end of a seven-year holding period, for
ownership in not more than five individuals and with 60% of its income composed of
investment type income, as defined in § 543, will generally be subject to the 70%
personal holding company tax on undistributed income. If gross rents received, less
depreciation, property taxes, interest and rents paid, account for more than 50% of the
corporation's income, it will not be treated as a personal holding company. Otherwise,
it will be. Therefore, the investor must be wary of using his real estate corporation's
accumulated earnings for investments other than in rental real estate.
26. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 341. Although this section is an intricate one, basically
it provides that a corporation is collapsible if it is formed or availed of to produce,
construct, or manufacture property with a view toward sale of the property before the
taxable income it could produce is substantially realized. A shareholder disposing of his
stock in such a corporation realizes ordinary income rather than capital gain. See
generally Brrri=, op. cit. supra note 23, ch. 10. This section could, in some circum-
stances, mitigate against the use of the corporate form by real estate investors inter-
ested in selling a project as soon as rapid depreciation subsides. For applicability gener-
ally of § 341 to real estate investments, see ANDEmsoN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 371-74,
381-83.
27. See 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 352-70.
28. Id. at 87-89.
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example, only eighty-eight per cent of accumulated depreciation
would be recaptured. After fourteen years and four months, there
would be no recapture at all. This cut-off proposal was designed "to
meet the assertion of real estate investors that such ordinary income
treatment would operate peculiarly in the real estate area to lock
them into their investments after a long period of time... ."29 An in-
vestor is locked into his investment if, upon seeing that his paper profits
will be reduced substantially by a tax bite, he elects to forego any
sale that might trigger the tax.
In their testimony before the Committee, real estate investors"°
responded with the following arguments. First, excessive depreciation
benefits are purely temporary in nature because they occur over only
a part of an asset's life. Second, since real estate is a relatively
illiquid investment, rates of return must be sufficiently high to attract
investors. With restricted depreciation allowances and harsh re-
capture rules, production of new rental housing would be considerably
dampened. Additionally, the lock-in effect of recapture would seri-
ously hamper mobility of capital. In short, "technical" tax reform
"will do serious harm to [these] more basic national considera-
tions ...."31
For personal property, full depreciation recapture became law in
the Revenue Act of 1962.32 Nevertheless, the House Ways and Means
Committee Report accompanying H.R. 10650 stated: "Your committee
decided not to apply this treatment to buildings . . . at this time
because testimony ... indicated that this treatment presents problems
where there is an appreciable rise in the value of real property at-
tributable to a rise in the general price level over a long period."33 In
its report, the Senate Committee on Finance noted without further
comment that it had made no change in the House bill in this regard.
4
As a result, the Revenue Act of 1962 contained no provision for
recapture of depreciation on real property.
When the Treasury went before Congress again in 1963, its proposal
remained unchanged. 35 What emerged from the House Committee
on Ways and Means bore only a superficial resemblance. The House
29. Id. at 88.
30. See 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 8, at 3553-64 (statement of Emil Gould, Nat'l
Ass'n of Homebuilders).
31. Id. at 3557.
32. Section 13 of the Revenue Act of 1962, P. L. 87-834, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct.
16, 1962), adding § 1245 to the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1962).
34. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1962).
35. STAFF OF THE JoiNT CoaiM2 . ON INT. REV. TAxATIoN, 88TH CONG., IST SESS.,
SUMMArtY OF THE PRESIDENT'S TAx MESSAGE OF 1963 67-68 (Comm. Print 1963).
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version was enacted. into law35 and is presently section 1250 of the
Internal Revenue Code. It provides that depreciation allowed on
realty shall be recaptured to the extent that it exceeds straight-line
depreciation. 37 Lest even this be too severe, Congress adopted the
idea of a sliding scale reduction as originally suggested by the
Treasury, though in quite a different context. Contrary to the
Treasury's stipulation, section 167 was not amended to impose any
new limitation upon the choice of methods for depreciating realty.
Under section 1250's sliding scale, however, the one percentage point
per month reduction of recapture begins not at the end of a six-year
holding period, but at the end of a twenty-month period. Thus there
is no recapture at all if depreciable real property is held for ten years.
All depreciation allowed is recaptured, however, if the property is
sold within the first twelve months.
For the hypothetical investment project discussed earlier, Table 5
shows the amount of double declining balance depreciation that would
be subject to recapture under section 1250 at the end of each of the
first ten years. Thereafter, there would be none at all.
TABLE 5
ANALYsIS OF DEPRECIATION
SUBJECT To REcApTuRIE UNDER § 1250
Total DDB Depreciation Subject to Recapture
End of Depreciation Percent of Total
Year Taken Amount Depreciation Taken
1 58,330 58,330 100
2 112,640 52,128 46
3 163,240 63,613 39
4 210,530 67,572 32
5 254,690 65,304 26
6 296,030 58,085 20
7 334,800 47,020 14
8 371,110 33,060 9
9 405,240 17,125 4
10 437,260 -0- -0-
In the last column of the table, depreciation subject to recapture is
36. Section 231 of the Revenue Act of 1964, P. L. 88-272, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb.
26, 1964).
37. The amount of depreciation subject to recapture is not the sum of annual excesses
of rapid depreciation over straight line depreciation. Rather, it is the cumulative excess.
Thus if property is held until annual rapid depreciation becomes less than annual
straight-line, the amount subject to recapture will begin an annual decline. See the
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shown as a per cent of total depreciation taken. This column is
demonstrative of section 1250's mildness. A similar tabular analysis
has led one writer to comment: "One point which cannot be over-
emphasized is the relatively mild impact of section 1250. The section
should not discourage any taxpayer from taking accelerated deprecia-
tion."
38
The Treasury's original proposal sought full recapture of all depre-
ciation taken on realty unless Congress restricted choice of deprecia-
tion methods. First under section 1250 recapture and then under
full recapture, Table 6 compares overall rates of return on invested
capital according to selected depreciation methods. These assump-
tions are made: The hypothetical investment property is sold at
the end of five years for a total price of 1,200,000 dollars, a sum just
equal to the original cost basis. Therefore, gain results only from
depreciation adjustments to the cost basis. Tax is computed under
the same assumptions about taxpayer income reflected in Tables 3 and
4. Again, income averaging is ignored.39 Net sale proceeds are
1,200,000 dollars less the unpaid mortgage principal of 846,730 dol-
lars, or 353,270 dollars. Net cash produced by the investment project
is calculated by adding to the net sale proceeds the total cash throwoff
plus 3 per cent tax-free interest compounded annually thereon. Then
the average annual rate of return on the original invested capital is
shown.
One may make two general observations from the information in
Table 6. Section 1250 recapture does not tend to influence this tax-
payer's rate of return in a manner which causes him to select the
slower methods of depreciation; whereas, full recapture would tend
so to do. Perhaps even more significant is a comparison of the
highest rate of return under section 1250 recapture to the highest rate
under full recapture. An amazing, though not unusual, seventeen
per cent annual rate of return with section 1250 recapture drops only
to eleven per cent with full recapture.
Section 1250 overrides several other preferential tax treatment
provisions of the Code, as does the earlier enacted section 1245.40
38. Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L. REv. 285,
342 (1965).
39. The telescoping effect, to the extent it is unmitigated by the operation of income
averaging rules, may aid the Treasury as against an individual taxpayer. High ordinary
income resulting from a large amount of recaptured depreciation may spread over a
number of tax rate brackets even with income averaging, perhaps driving the effective
tax rate on this income higher than the taxpayer's effective tax rate on the depreciation
deductions claimed in earlier years. However, splitting the recapture among a number
of owners, as in a syndicate or real estate investment trust, tends to mitigate the tele-
scoping effect.
40. For an illuminating, comprehensive discussion of the technical operation of these
sections, see Horvitz, supra note 38. For another comprehensive discussion of §
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Unless an exception or limitation is specified, section 1250 was in-
tended to recapture depreciation whenever there occurs a disposition
of any kind.41 Even in instances where capital gain is presently
unrecognized, depreciation will be recaptured, primarily because a
transferee does not receive the transferor's basis. For example, a
distribution of real property as a corporate dividend creates a re-
capture liability for the corporation, because the shareholder's basis
becomes fair market value at the date of distribution. Generally,
where a basis carryover is possible, ordinary income potential, that is,
accumulated depreciation subject to recapture, is also carried over.
For example, a donor's basis and his ordinary income potential carry
over to the donee and a distributee partner receives the partnership's
ordinary income potential. Though generally basis carryover is the
rule, special recapture computational rules are often applied to like-
kind exchanges in the year of exchange. These special rules may
cause a recognition where formerly there was none if ordinary income
potential would be inadequately carried over. In otherwise tax-free
transfers, the passing of any boot usually causes recognition of ordi-
nary recapture income. Where recapture would otherwise be fore-
closed by a disposition, operation of section 1250 may be triggered.
For example, charitable contribution deductions under section 170(e)
must be reduced by any ordinary income potential. But the great
leveler, death, levels ordinary income potential just as it does capital
gain potential.
On balance then, it would seem that the real estate investor was
treated quite gingerly by Congress. Why, one asks, especially in
view of the Treasury's success with section 1245's relatively stringent
rules. The House Ways and Means Committee gave this rationale
for section 1250's mildness:
Your committee generally has limited the depreciation recapture to the
excess over straight line depreciation because it believes that only to this
extent could the depreciation taken appropriately be considered in excess
of the decline in the value of the property which occurs over time. If a
gain still occurs, it is believed that this is attributable to a rise in price
levels generally rather than to an absence of a decline in the value of the
property. The portion representing the rise in value is comparable to other
1245, see Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1483 (1963). Tax Management, Inc., a division of BNA, in its
portfolio series publishes a useful practitioner's manual on the technical operation of
these sections: 97 T.M. Depreciation Recapture-Sections 1245 and 1250 (1964). See also
Fuller, The Recapture of Depreciation, 39 TurL. L. REv. 15 (1964); Lasseigne, The
Revenue Act of 1964: Depreciation of Real Property, Controlled Corporations and Per-
sonal Holding Companies, 39 TusL. L. Rxv. 41 (1964).
41. H. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1963). Section 1245 was similarly
intended and similarly written.
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forms of gains which quite generally are treated as capital gains. Moreover,
your committee believes that when the property is held for an extended
period of time, gains realized on the sale or other disposition of the property
are more likely to be attributable to price rises generally than to an excess of
depreciation deductions,42
Quite a different reason can be inferred from this passage from
"Requiem':
I next shall attempt a brief survey of some of the important economic
groups in our society and how they are faring in the race for special benefits.
To a large extent favored treatment is being conferred in a sporadic manner,
without regard to what privileges are available to one class and withheld
from another. Cases evoking sympathy and a desire to provide benefits are
individually brought to the attention of Congress, and treated upon an ad
hoc basis.
Those individuals who are well advised, or especially fitted by occupation,
training, and background, are likely to be able to realize fully the opportu-
nities for minimizing their tax burdens. Today the large investor probably
constitutes the most important beneficiary of preferential treatment.43
The National Association of Homebuilders, "the sole national spokes-
man of the homebuilding industry in the United States,"44 exerted
substantial efforts at the 1962 and 196345 congressional hearings to
defeat first, and successfully, the original Treasury proposal and
then, unsuccessfully, the House version later enacted as section
1250.46 There was no organized, stiff resistance to section 1245.
42. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03 (1963). The Senate Commit-
tee adopted this view, in substantially unchanged wording. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 133 (1964).
43. Cary, supra note 1, at 763.
44. 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 8, at 3554 (statement of Emil Could, Chairman, Tax
Studies Committee, Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders).
45. The organization's statement concerning the Revenue Act of 1962 is found in
1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 8, at 3553-64. See also Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax
Recommendations Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., v. 2, at 1233-39 (1961) (statement of E. J. Burke, Jr., President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Homebuilders) [the Hearings are hereinafter cited as 1961 House Hearings]. Its 1963
testimony is found in Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1983-89 (1963) (statement of W. Evans Buchanan,
President, Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders, as presented by Leonard L. Silverman, Tax
Counsel) [the Hearings are hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate Hearings].
46. In the 1963 testimony that failed to get § 1250 modified, it is interesting to
note the NAHB's proposal: "While NAHB appreciates the problems involved in this
area and therefore does not quarrel with the general objectives of this section, we be-
lieve that the sliding scale should be changed so as to reduce the resulting lock-in of
investment in depreciable realty." Id. at 1984. And, "we would see merit in this pro-
vision if the sliding scale reallocation from ordinary income to capital gain potential
presently set at 1 percent per month after a holding period of 20 months was to be
increased from 1 to 2 percent per month. . . . The 'lock-in' period would thus be
reduced from 10 years to approximately 6 years." Id. at 1987.
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One survey47 of major corporation executives indicated that manage-
ment would have been more than willing to give up recapture, or
even the whole section 1231, in order to get favorable depreciation
reform.4 Furthermore, depreciation recapture on machinery is not
uncommon in the tax laws of other industrial nations.49 Senator Paul
H. Douglas offered still another reason for the Treasury's failure in
1963:
The administration initially made a partial but somewhat ineffectual effort
at tax reform. But when most of its proposals were rejected by the House
Ways and Means Committee, they ceased to fight with any vigor except on
two matters [neither of which was section 1250's mildness],50
IV. THE EcoNoMIsTs' ARGUMENTS
Two pervasive concepts of taxation, depreciation and capital gains,
necessitated the legislature's real estate depreciation recapture provi-
sion. Although there is a substantial amount of economic literature
on both,5 there is little theoretical unanimity on either.
Obviously, were capital gains not differentiated from other kinds
of income and granted preferential tax treatment, the recapture ques-
tion would not arise at all. What are capital gains? Why are they
treated differently? Professor Blum, in the most comprehensive article
on the capital gains controversy, suggests this pragmatic view:
A capital gain in the context of an income tax is a wholly arbitrary concept
created exclusively by the tax law. It is easy to be misled into thinking
otherwise.
This is not to say that the tax law cannot find conceptions of capital gains
to copy and expand. Rather, the difficulty is that there are too many
different ones and they are inconsistent with each other. Thus the tax
law struggles to incorporate such diverse notions of capital gains as unusual
or non-recurring gains; gains due to market fluctuations; unexpected gains;
gains accruing over long periods of time; gains not attributable to services
47. Powell, Management Views of Tax Depreciation, IND. Bus. REP. No. 34, 24-25,
59 (1962). Results of this study were also published in Milroy, Istvan & Powell, The
Tax Depreciation Muddle, 36 ACCOuNTiNG REv. 540 (1961).
48. Acting in its administrative capacity in July, 1962, the Treasury Department con-
tributed significantly to the depreciation liberalization that management sought by is-
suing Depreciation Guidelines and Rules, I.R.S. Pun. No. 456, Rev. Proc. 61-21 (rev.
Aug., 1964). In that same year Congress liberalized salvage value rules and passed the
investment credit, all as a part of the program to stimulate modernization of the econ-
omy's industrial plant.
49. See, e.g., the Treasury survey of depreciation recapture in other countries in 1962
Senate Hearings, pt. 2, at 928-31.
50. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1964). Once again is demonstrated
the political problem arising to hamper tax reform when it is inextricably linked with
broad fiscal policy measures such as the 1964 tax rate reduction bill.
51. See the bibliography appended to this note.
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rendered by the gainer.
More and more the law has come'to depart from any non-tax conception
of capital gain and to recognize frankly that a capital gain is merely some
form of income taxed at a bargain rate.
52
If there is then no natural economic law of capital gains, one
necessarily must proceed on an ad hoc basis. A capital gain is what
the tax law says it is. In each instance the issue is why do lawmakers
call something a capital gain. The reason given by Congress for
section 1250 was that gains accruing over long periods of time are apt
to be due to price level changes; depreciation allowances, to the
extent not "excessive," reflect "declines in value."53 Therefore, except
for "excessive" depreciation, these gains will be treated as capital
gains. There are in this reasoning two elusive concepts, value
decline and excessive depreciation. First, if property can be sold at
a gain, how is it possible to reason that there has been a decline in
value? The idea alluded to is that a building will physically deteriorate
over a period of time. Immediately one is tempted to conclude that
its value has declined. But the economist recognizes the value of a
capital asset to be the present value of its discounted stream of future
receipts. Expectations concerning this stream create market values.
Many forces mold expectations; still others determine the building's
receipt stream, only one of which is physical condition. As has been
pointed out, given good management and maintenance policies, even
the building's physical condition may improve with age. Management,
of course, is service rendered by the gainer, something which is usually
taxable as ordinary income. Another little recognized service con-
tributed by the gainer is his entrepreneurship in directing the assem-
bly of bricks, mortar, and labor into a building. This personal service
factor alone may account for a newly erected building having value
in excess of the cost of its components, including labor.
The problem encountered in formulating laws to recognize these
many variables, and to tax them accordingly, is one of quantification,
that is, of measurement. When the convenient spectre of inflation is
involved, it is not surprising that the other variables get ignored.
Fundamentally, there is not a close correlation between changes in
the value of money and the price of a specific complex asset like a
building. The price of a given building may rise quicker than the
value of the dollar declines, it may rise slower, or it may not rise at
all. After all, the inflation question should not be how to tax assets,
but how to tax people. "If redistribution [of income and property]
52. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAxES 247, 262-63
(1957).
53. H.R. RPp. No. 749, supra note 42.
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by inflation is unfair, then surely taxation of inflationary gains does
not move in an inequitable direction." 4 Nevertheless, the recapture
issue is not whether to tax as ordinary income all inflationary gain
even if it could be accurately identified, but whether to tax as
ordinary income that portion of gain, whatever gives rise to it,
attributable to past ordinary income deductions. Thus recapture is
a tax benefit argument, which hardly seems inequitable when balanced
against the imponderables of inflation and these other variables. The
averaging law now provides a mitigation for the telescoping effect,
or bunching of ordinary income into a single period, so as to prevent,
generally, a tax burden in the year of recapture disproportionate to
the tax benefits obtained from depreciation deductions in earlier
years.
The second and even more economically elusive concept is "exces-
sive" depreciation. Its genesis is probably the Treasury proposal which
would have limited real estate depreciation to the amounts deductible
under the straight-line method. From this proposal, the fathers of
section 1250 probably fastened onto the notion that straight-line
depreciation is normal. Consequently, accelerated depreciation must
be abnormal; therefore, the difference between the two is "excessive."
If this was the chain of intuitive reasoning underlying the concept, it
is difficult to imagine why the sliding-scale discount feature was
adopted. Probably, the creators of section 1250, noticing that the
original Treasury plan had contained such a feature, adapted it for
their own purposes :5  in the name of inflation, recapture should be
mild, and here was a moderating device which could handily be
used. One also wonders what made Congress think straight-line
depreciation is normal depreciation since the only evidence56 presented
54. Blum, supra note 52, at 256.
55. Although the distortion of the Treasury's real property depreciation recapture
proposal was probably more subtle, the proposal being more complex, elsewhere in its
1963 H.R. 8363, the House Ways and Means Committee had lifted Treasury proposals
out of context so as to favor investors as an economic group. One of the administra-
tion's most eagerly sought reforms was constructive taxation of capital gains at death.
To make this proposal more attractive, the Treasury packaged it with a favorable re-
vision of capital gains rates. The proposal for taxation of capital gains at death sank
without a trace in the Committee but the favorable revision of capital gains rates did
not. It passed the Committee, and it passed the House. To defeat it the administration
had to mount an all-out campaign. This was one of the two hard fights mentioned by
Senator Douglas. The other bard fight was over the dividend tax credit, another in-
vestor-favoring measure that the administration had sought to eliminate. See Senator
Douglas' commentary in S. RE.P. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 163-67 (1964).
56. In one real estate expert's words, "It seems to be accepted in the real estate
industry that depreciation is measured by mortgage amortization-the amount that you
have to pay off on the mortgage, by and large, is considered about equivalent to cur-
rent wastage of asset." 1961 House Hearings, v. 2, 1247 (statement of Mark H. Johnson)
(quoted in a Treasury exhibit in 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 356).
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in the hearings tended to indicate that sinking fund.:depreciation is
more likely to represent "actual declines in value." Before enactment
of section 1250, but after passage of section 1245, Mr. Donald Schapiro
worried that windfall gains on personalty might be taxed as ordinary
income via recapture.5 7 He therefore suggested that only excessive
depreciation be recaptured. His rule, however, was to define excessive
depreciation as the difference between depreciation taken and sinking
fund depreciation. Adopting the notion later to be used by Congress,
Mr. Schapiro equated "actual decline in value" with depreciation
which reflects a using-up of the asset's service life. He then per-
suasively stated the economic case for his recapture rule as follows:
The decline in the value of an asset in any year, which reflects the con-
sumption of useful service life, may be measured by the loss of one year's
useful service life at the end of an asset's life. A depreciable asset may
be expected to generate a stream of income over its useful service life, and
the present value of the asset is the discounted value of the stream of
income plus the asset's salvage value. Utilization of the asset for one
year reduces by one year the period during which the stream of income
may be expected, but the discounting process attaches less value to
the last year of the stream of income in comparison to earlier years.
Since it is this value which has been exhausted, under this valuation
theory the value of an asset is reduced in its early life by an amount
less than straight-line depreciation. This method of depreciation is referred
to as sinking fund depreciation. The best approach may be to limit
recapture of depreciation deductions on all depreciable property (build-
ings and leaseholds as well as personal property) to the amount by which
depreciation actually allowed exceeds the amount allowable under the
sinking fund method (assuming for simplicity a single, perhaps 5 per cent
rate of interest). This rule would deal in an economically rational manner
with all taxpayers, and it would eliminate the inconsistent results which
section 1245 may produce when changed economic conditions have caused
substantial appreciation in value.5
If one is willing to concede the elusive concept of "actual decline
in value," and, as a logical result, becomes willing to concede recap-
ture only of "excessive" depreciation, then Mr. Schapiro's argument is
far more rational than the one found in the congressional reports.59
A comparison of the amounts of depreciation subject to recapture
under section 1250 on the one hand, and under Mr. Schapiro's sinking
fund proposal on the other, is set forth in Table 7. This table, like
57. Schapiro, supra note 40, at 1507-12. He cited a case in which a ship's selling
price had become inflated as a result of the Suez crisis. Fribourg Nay. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 335 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). Professor Blum's corn-
ment mentions an unexpected or windfall gain as one of the diverse concepts of capital.
gains. Fribourg is a classic illustration of this sort of gain.
58. Schapiro, supra note 40, at 1509-10.
59. The congressional argument is quoted in text accompanying note 42 supra.
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Table 5, shows double declining balance depreciation actually taken
on the hypothetical investment project for each of the first ten years.
TABLE 7
CONUMSON oF SINxNc FUND ICAPTunE
To SECTION 1250 RECAPTuiE
Total DDB Sinking Fund Depreciation Subject to Recapture
End of Depreciation Depreciation Sinking Fund Section
Year Taken Allowable Proposal 1250 Difference
1 58,330 10,112 58,330* 58,330 -0-
2 112,640 20,831 91,809 52,128 39,681
3 163,240 32,193 131,047 63,613 67,434
4 210,530 44,237 166,293 67,572 98,721
5 254,690 57,003 197,687 65,304 132,383
6 296,030 70,535 255,495 58,085 167,410
7 334,800 84,879 249,921 47,020 202,901
8 371,110 100,084 271,026 33,060 237,966
9 405,240 116,201 289,039 17,125 271,914
10 437,260 133,285 303,975 -0- 303,975
*Here it is assumed that all depreciation taken is recaptured if there is a sale at the
end of year one, as is provided by section 1250.
The last three columns of the table show first "excessive" depreciation
subject to recapture under a six per cent sinking fund proposal, next
the amount under section 1250, and finally, the difference between
the two. This difference is the amount of "excessive" depreciation (as
defined pursuant to at least some measure of economic logic) which
Congress and section 1250 leave unrecaptured. It is not incon-
siderable during the crucially profitable first ten years of a tax
shelter's life, as inspection of the dollar amounts in the column will
reveal.
Another argument against recapture was often raised in the con-
gressional hearings although it was not vigorously propounded in
the committee reports as was the price-level argument. Investors
assert a lock-in effect of recapture, which, according to Secretary
Dillon,60 had caused the Treasury to propose the sliding-scale cut-off.
The lock-in assertion is a mobility of capital argument, aimed at tax-
caused hindrances of rational economic decision making. Recapture,
so goes the argument, will bias the investor against freely transferring
his funds from one investment to another on their economic merits,
60. 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 1 at 87-89.
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if upon so doing, his capital6' will be reduced by an increased tax
bite. Thus investors, as a class, become less willing to transfer assets,
and capital becomes less mobile. Although the argument is not
without some economic logic, the lock-in effect has probably been
vastly overrated.62 As long as demand for rental housing continues
to increase because of both population and income increases, capital
will mobilize to build profitable rental housing. Continual increases
in demand are far more powerful stimulants than recapture is a
depressant.
A second reason exists for paying little heed to the lock-in argument.
It fails to place recapture in the perspective of the overall tax
system. The primary question to be raised is this: do our present
tax laws reflect a strong underlying policy of protecting capital's
mobility, of zealously guarding rational investment choice? Emphat-
ically, they do not. Many economists reason that section 1014's basis
step-up at death is the worst lock-in feature of our tax laws. This
reasoning is a more realistic appraisal of why the tax law causes an
investor to hold property rather than sell it. It is not his reluctance
to lose part of his appreciation to the tax collector that keeps him
from selling; instead, it is his sure knowledge that his economic unit,
his family, can wholly avoid the tax on that appreciation when he dies.
Analogous reasoning may be applied to the sliding-scale cut-off feature
of section 1250 recapture. An investor, knowing that the longer he
holds his real estate the lower becomes its ordinary income potential,
61. Note that "capital" here means original capital plus appreciation thereon. To
digress momentarily, the tax bite comes from the appreciation, not from original capital.
If appreciation is income, why should it be taxed preferentially? A dollar is a dollar,
from whatever source derived. In Professor Blum's opinion, this statement is "perhaps
decisive" for non-preferential taxation of capital gains. Blum, supra note 52, at 266.
62. To this writer, the lock-in argument is more economic mythology than economic
reason. It is not unlike another economic myth now on the wane (see Time, Dec. 31,
1965, cover story on Keynesian economics, pp. 64-67B), that only a balanced federal
budget is sound fiscal policy. Like the balanced budget which can be desirable within
certain, reasonably narrow, limits, lock-in can be a deterrent in certain investment situa-
tions, but it doesn't take much to overcome the lock-in effect. See Professor Walter
Heller's careful analysis of the lock-in mythology concerning the capital gains tax, an
analysis demonstrating just what a small percentage point shift in the rate of return on
alternative investments is needed to overcome an investor's reluctance to shuffle his
securities portfolio, thereby incurring a tax asserted to be locking him into his invest-
ment. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the
Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 309-11 (1956). Another strong parallel be-
tween the lock-in myth and the balanced-budget myth is that, though vigorously urged,
it is usually unaccompanied by any detailed analysis of the probable economic results
and ramifications of the measures its proponent is seeking from Congress. Compare the
statement of Jonathan Brown of the New York Stock Exchange to Professor Heller's.
Id. at 307. Two unstated premises of the lock-in assertion are that any deterrent to
free movement of investment funds is economically undesirable, and that investors al-
ways behave rationally in refusing to incur taxes. A challenge to these premises may
be found in Blum, supra note 52, at 258.
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will be tempted to wait out the sliding-scale. In contrast, the real
estate lobby had actually used its version of the lock-in argument to
urge adoption of sliding-scale cut-off of recapture in the first place.
Though probably somewhat overstating his case, one commentator
has estimated "as a general range of magnitudes that probably four-
fifths of all capital gains accrue outside the tax system."6 3 On the
other hand, of all long-term capital gain reported by individuals in,
for example, 1959, only eighteen per cent was attributable to real
estate.6 Thus, real estate depreciation recapture, full or partial, is
unlikely to impose relatively significant immobility on the economy's
capital movements. True enough, less new capital might be used for
construction of new rental properties because they are less tax-
favored, but the whole idea of mobility of capital anyway is that
investment decisions should be made on their economic merits, not
on their tax merits.
If, in the final analysis, the tax law should be neutral in its effect
upon economic decision-making in real estate capital formation, reform
of present depreciation provisions is needed, rather than an attempt
at recapturing the "excessive" depreciation presently allowed by the
Internal Revenue Code. A discussion of the depreciation policy re-
quired to prevent tax-caused decisions, along with a mathematical
proof of the conclusion reached, was presented in a recent paper by
one of the nation's most distinguished economists, Professor Paul A.
Samuelson, who writes:
How must "income" be defined if present discounted valuations of all as-
sets, and therefore all optimization decisions, are to be independent of the
tax rate each person is subject to?
Fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance. -
If, and only if, true loss of economic value is permitted as a tax-deductible
depreciation expense will the present discounted value of a cash-receipt
stream be independent of the rate of tax.
The only sensible definition of depreciation relevant to measurement of
true money income is putative decline in economic value. Fast-depreciation
gimmicks in the Swedish, Japanese, German, British, and American tax codes
are not a return to just recognition of economic obsolescence .... They are
* * * designed to undertax money income (and perhaps obviate the bias
against capital formation inherent in taxing income rather than consumption
or wealth).65
The Committee on Concepts and Standards of the American Ac-
63. Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 1194, HousI
COMM. ON WAYS AND M-ANs, 86TH CONG., IST SESS. (Comm. Print 1959).
64. 1963 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 197.
65. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valua-
tions, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 604, 606 (1964). But see Smith, Tax Depreciation Policy and
Investment Theory, 4 INT'L EcoN. Rv. 80 (1963).
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counting Association has acceded to this view, which would require
any standard for measurement of current income to recognize "the
current cost of the expiration of asset service potential,"6 that is, to
recognize Professor Samuelson's putative decline in an asset's economic
value. Nevertheless, the influential American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants still adheres to the cost-expiration, timetable con-
cept of depreciation reflected in the Internal Revenue Code.67 Its
central defense of this admittedly theoretically deficient concept is
based upon a practical need for an easily applied, mechanically objec-
tive method for cost allocation. Whatever the reasons of convenience
proffered for its usage, a cost allocation methodology for depreciation
tax deductions tends to cause uneconomic investment decision making.
V. A CONCLUSION AND SOME SUGGESTED ILEFORMATIVE GUIDELINES
Inescapably, the real estate tax shelter still exists, and is practically
unmodified by section 1250. A reform measure originally designed by
the Treasury to strike at its essence, and in the process increase annual
tax revenues by eighty million dollars,O was substantially rejected by
the Congress which passed section 1250, a measure increasing annual
tax revenues by only fifteen million dollars.69
One question raised at the time should again be posed and answered.
Do our depreciation tax laws need to favor real estate development
purely in the interests of economic growth and capital formation in
the American- economy? It is here submitted emphatically that the
answer should be "no," that instead an elaborate machinery capable of
pervasively influencing both growth and stability in construction is
already existent, a machinery capable of being far more satisfactory
and far less insensitive than the tax laws, the federal mortgage credit
program. Recently, that program has undergone searching congres-
sional studies evaluating its adaptability to achieving the goals of
growth and stability in the construction sector of the economy.70 Con-
66. Committee on Concepts and Standards, American Accounting Association, Ac-
counting for Land, Buildings, and Equipment, 39 AccouNTiNG REv. 693, 695-96 (1964).
The American Accounting Association is composed of college and university accounting
teachers.
67. See Comn'rrE ON TERMINOLOGY, AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF CEIRTiFiD PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, AccOuNTING TERMINOLOGY BULLETINS, REVIEW AND RESUME No. 1, 20-
25 (1961), published in ACCOUNTING RtsEARCh AND TERMINOLOGY BULLETINs, FINAL
EDrnoN (1961). See also GRADY, IN oNTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES FOR BusiNEss ENTERPRISEs 415-21 (AICPA Accounting Research Study No.
7, 1965).
68. 1962 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 89. By way of comparison, full recapture of
personalty depreciation under § 1245, it was estimated, would increase revenues by
100 million dollars, only twenty million more.
69. 1963 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 239.
70. SuEcommrrEE ON Housim, SENATE CoMM. ON BANxING AND CuRENcx, 86TH
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clusions there reached were (1) that the residential housing sector has
been plagued by instability in the flow of capital funds and by greater
cost inflation than most other sectors of the economy; 71 and (2) that
flexible credit terms policy applied according to certain principles set
out in the study can tend substantially to stabilize a high rate of growth
in the construction sector, given the projected increases in demand over
the next decades.12 Though the study does not explicitly call for it, a
depreciation tax policy economically neutral would seem a logical
complement to the application of credit policy there recommended.
Certainly, in view of inflationary, unstable capital formation tendencies
in the sector, heavily favorable, even tempting, tax shelter practices
are undesirable and unneeded.
Therefore, in descending order of economic merit, the following are
ranked as guidelines for reform:
1. Restrict allowable depreciation of real estate improvements to
sinking fund depreciation. This proposal is premised upon the need
for tax neutrality in economic decision-making. Sinking fund depre-
ciation would be the best timetable depreciation approximation of the
probable decline in economic value of realty improvements, in view of
the preceding economic analysis and of the generally accepted notions
in the industry. Because of the present state of the accounting art, it
is perhaps several years premature to suggest that the Internal Reve-
nue Code ideally should reflect the valuation principles set out by Pro-
fessor Samuelson and the American Association of Accountants.
2. Whatever the depreciation methodology allowable, recapture de-
preciation upon sale of real property to the extent that it creates gain.
This proposal, though secondary to the preceding one, would tend to
reduce the incidence of tax-caused investment decision-making in a
sector of the economy where it is too prevalent. It also has an equit-
able appeal. It would not permit deductions from ordinary income to
be transformed into capital gains. Note that it should really go hand-
in-glove with proposal number 1, as a necessary complement.
3. Recapture depreciation to the extent that it exceeds sinking fund
CONG., 2D SEss., STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT (Comm. Print 1960). Also available is
a thorough series of statistical studies on trends in capital formation sponsored by the
National Bureau of Economic Research, three entries in which bear directly on the
question at hand. See GiFmr.am, BLANK & WINNICK, CAPITAL FOnMATION IN RESI-
DENTIAL REAL ESTATE: TREV S AND PnOSPECTS (1956); KLAMAN, THE POSTWAR RMS-
DENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET (1960); KuzNETs, CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:
ITS FonmATION AND FINANCING (1961).
71. See O'Leary, Postwar Trends in the Sources and Uses of Capital Funds, 1947-57,
STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT, supra note 70 at 209, 234.
72. REPORT ON STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HoUsInG TO THE
COMsrrrR ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STUDY OF MORTGAGE CREDIT, supra note 70,
at 401, 429-31.
1364 [ VOL.. 19
depreciation. This is nothing more than a compromise between the
views here expressed and the legislative views underlying section
1250. It is a compromise which does utilize some of the economic
analysis that should be more frequently employed in this area.
4. Continue the reign of section 1250. This proposal has nothing to
defend it except an observation that, on equitable grounds, it is better
than to adopt the next alternative.
5. Recapture no real estate depreciation at all. This seems indefens-
ible on any economic or equitable grounds.
To summarize, section 1250 is demonstrably mild. In its effort for
tax reform, the Treasury sought a restriction to straight-line deprecia-
tion methods on real estate, and it sought imposition of ordinary tax
on that part of gain from a sale of real property which was attributable
to the straight-line depreciation deductions. Instead, Congress merely
imposed a recapture on depreciation in excess of straight-line and even
then only partially, depending on the length of the holding period. As
manifested by the Committee Reports, section 1250's underlying ra-
tionale that price level movements primarily cause real property value
appreciations is at best economically questionable. To whatever extent
its passage was motivated by congressional feelings for mobility of
capital, one can only demonstrate that those feelings are largely in-
choate, but do tend to crystallize when a rationalization rather than a
broad social policy is to be applied. In the spirit of Mr. Cary's "Re-
quiem," a final comment-section 1250 does not at all brake the ac-
celerating tendency toward preferential treatment of pressure groups
and away from uniformity. The section's convolutions illustrate anew
the often repeated observation that special treatment of capital gains
contributes more complexity to the Internal Revenue Code than any
other feature of our tax heritage.
Civari=s S. FBNKLIN
Appendix: A Representative Bibliography
I. Taxation of Investments in Real Estate
ANDERSON & TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE OPERATIONS (3d ed. 1964).
B.N.A., 71-2d T.M., Depreciation of Real Estate (1964).
CASEY, REAL ESTATE DESK BOOK (1964).
CERF, REAL ESTATE AND = FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1965).
EDITORIAL STAFF, PRENTICE HALL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAX SHELTER PRACTICES 710-82
(1963).
ENGEL, REAL ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES (1965).
Hecht, Rollover Basis Can Solve Depreciation Shelter Problem, 42 TAXEs 114 (1964).
1966 ] NOTES 1365
1366 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 19
II. Capital Gains
Arnett, Application of the Capital Gains and Losses Concept in Practice, 40 ACCOUNTING
REv. 54 (1965).
Benjamin, Real Estate and Taxes: Acquisition of a Tract for Eventual Resale-Capital
Gain or Ordinary Income on Resale, 18 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON TAXATION, A.B.A.
No. 2, p. 8 (Jan. 1965).
Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAxEs 247 (1957).
David, Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax, 54 Aid. EcoN. REv. 288 (1964);
Brown, Discussion, id. at 306.
SuBcoMmrrrEE ON TAX PoLIcY OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIsC REPORT,
84th Cong., Ist Sess. FEDEnaL TAX PoLicy FOR ECONOMIC GRowTH AND STABILITY
367, (Comm. Print 1955).
Hinrichs, An Empirical Measure of Investors' Responsiveness to Differentials in Capital
Gains Tax Rates Among Income Groups, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 224 (1963).
Holt & Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains Tax, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 337
(1962).
Malkiel & Kane, U.S. Tax Law and the Locked-In Effect, 16 NAT'L TAx J. 389 (1963).
PAUL, TAXATiON IN THE UNITED STATES 677-685 (1954).
SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES (1951).
SIM'ONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM (1950).
SIv ONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION, ch. 7 (1938).
House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 TAX REIWSION COM-
PENDIum, 1193-1299 (Comm. Print 1959).
Wallich, Taxation of Capital Gains in the Light of Recent Economic Developments, 18
NAT'L TAX J. 133 (1965).
Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax,
1918-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949).
III. Depreciation
Bell, Elementary Economics and Depreciation Accounting, 50 AM. ECON. REv. 154
(1960).
Brown, The New Depreciation Policy Under the Income Tax: An Economic Analysis, 8
NAT'L TAX J. 81 (1955).
Caplin & Klayman, Depreciation-1965 Model, J. Accountancy, April 1965, p. 34.
Committee on Concepts and Standards, American Accounting Association, Accounting
for Land, Buildings, and Equipment, 39 AcCOUNTING REv. 693 (1964).
Depreciation: Working with the Evolving Problems, A Special Report, 18 J. TAXATioN
258-81 (1963).
Domar, The Case for Accelerated Depreciation, 67 Q.J. ECON. 493 (1953).
Domar, Depreciation, Replacement and Growth, 63 ECONOMIC J. 1 (1953).
Eisner, Accelerated Amortization, Growth and Net Profits, 66 Q.J. ECON. 533 (1952).
Eisner, Accelerated Depreciation: Some Further Thoughts, 69 Q.J. EcoN. 285 (1955).
Eisner, Depreciation Under the New Tax Law, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1955, p. 66.
Frank, A Closer Look at Two Accelerated Depreciation Methods, NAA Bull., Dec. 1964,
p. 35.
GOLDBFRc, CONCEPTS OF DEPRECIATION (1960).
Goggans, Liberalized Depreciation and Investment Decisions, J. Accountancy, May
1964, p. 42.
Goode, Accelerated Depreciation Allowances as a Stimulus to Investment, 69 Q.J. EcoN.
191 (1955).
Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises,
415-21 (AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 7, 1965).
LYON, DEPRECIATION Am TAXES: BEFORE AND AFTER EVENUE PROCEDURE 62-21
(1962).
Papers on Tax Depreciation Policy Presented at 1961 University of Pennsylvania Tax
Conference, 40 TAXES 163-207 (1962).
Parish, A New Concept of Real Estate Depreciation, 41 TAXES 598 (1963).
Powell, Management Views of Tax Depreciation, Indiana Business Report No. 34 (1962).
Ray, Some Economic Aspects of Depreciation Accounting, Q. Rev. Economics & Bus.,
Feb. 1962, p. 59.
(Richs, Year to Switch to Straight Line Depreciation, 39 AccoUNTINrG REV. 685 (1964).
Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations,
62 J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964).
Smith, Tax Depreciation Policy and Investment Theory, 4 INT'L ECON. REV. 80 (1963).
HOUSE COMmITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 TAx REVISION COM-
PENDum 793-931, (Comm. Print 1959).
TERBORGi, EFFECT OF THE NEv TAX DEPRECIATION METHODS ON THE EARINGs OF
DEPECIABLE ASSETS (1956).
TERBORGH, REALISTIC DEPRECIATION POIACY (1954).
IV. Depreciation Recapture
Baldwin, Depreciation Recapture, J. Accountancy, April 1965, p. 64.
B.N.A., 97 T.M., Depreciation Recapture, Sections 1245 and 1250 (1964).
Braitman, From the Thoughful Tax Man, 43 TAxEs 162 (1965).
Ferrari, 1964 Act: Real Property Hit by Depreiation Recapture: Effects Reach All Areas
of Code, 20 J. TAXATION 308 (1964).
Fuller, The Recapture of Depreciation, 39 TUL. L. REV. 15 (1964).
Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L. REV. 285 (1965).
Kahn, Recapture of Depreciation, 42 TAXES 918 (1964).
Lasseigne, The Revenue Act of 1964: Depreciation of Real Property, Controlled Cor-
porations and Personal Holding Companies, 39 Tur. L. REv. 41 (1964).
McAnallen, The Recapture Rules-,§§ 47, 1245, 1250: How They Work, What They
Mean, How to Plan, 21 J. TAxATIoN 272 (1964).
Rosbe, Recapture of Excess Depreciation, Investment Credit, Reserves and Other Items,
43 TAxEs 904 (1965).
Schapiro, Recapture of Depreciation and Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue Code, 72
YALE L. J. 1483 (1963).
NOTES 13671966 ]
